National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 30 October, 1943 - File No. 25





Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 675

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DRAFTED BY EA/PIAHROSENILGR APPROVED BY EAPP - ARTHUR H. ROSEN EA - MR HUMMEL (SUBST) L/EA = MR. JOHNSON EA/IMS - MR. HEAVNER L/OA - MS. WEST DOD/PA - MR. FREEMAN S/PRS - MR, KING

118804

0 302239Z OCT 73 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, MY SUBJ: TRANSIT OF USS HANCOCK AND MALACCA STRAITS ISSUE

REF & KUALA LUMPUR 4734.

EMBASSY MAY PROPERLY DECLINE COMMENT ON PRESS REPORTS WHICH CLAIM TO QUOTE UNNAMED SOURCES SPEAKING "PRIVATELY". YOU MAY ADD THAT AT PRESS BRIEFING OCTOBER 31 DOD SPOKES. MAN NOTED THAT PRESENCE OF TASK FORCE 77.6 IN INDIAN OCEAN UPELATES ONLY RPT ONLY TO U.S. INTEREST IN OPERATING IN INDIAN OCEAN FROM TIME TO TIME

2. IF PRESSED, HOWEVER, DEPT SPOKESMAN WILL SAY OUR POSITION REMAINS THAT SEAFARING NATIONS HAVE THE RIGHT

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
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OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS BY EITHER WARSHIPS OR COMMERCIAL VESSELS. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND TRANSIT THROUGH THEM WILL BE FULLY EXPLORED AND RESOLVED AT THE FORTHCOMING LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE. KISSINGER

TOP SECKET





NMCC

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

30 0 tober 1973 EST

MS W

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Recapitulation of Airlift Deliveries to Israel

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Listed below are data covering US airlift deliveries to Israel as of 0830Z 30 October 1973:

Totals for 24- Hour Periods Ending 07302 on.	· ,	Tonnages	•		
the Day Shown*	24 Oct	25 Oct		26, Oct	27 Oct
By Soviets By U.S. Mil By El Al	380-528 985 176	20-40 816 15	:	340-480 867 212	410-564 858 - 370**
	28 Oct	29 Oct		30 Oct	
By Soviets By U.S. Mil By El Al	330-456 846 1 7 1	320-432 792 309		180-252 640 85	
Cumulative Total	1s# 24 Oct	25 Oct		26 Oct	27 Oct
By Soviets By U.S. Mil By U.S./El Al	10090-12852 7905 2089	10110-12876 8721 2104	10	450-13356 9588 2316	10860-13920 10446 2686**
	28 Oct	29 Oct		30 Oct	•
By Soviets By U.S. Mil By U.S./El Al	11190-14376 11292 2857	11510-14808 12084 3166		690-15060 12724 3251	

^{* 0830}Z commencing 28 Oct. Excluding aircraft delivered. ** Includes reconciliation of previously unreported tonnages.

Classified by NMCC, DDO

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL PECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY XGDS-3

TOP SECRET DECLASSIFY ON ___N/A

TOP SECRET

U.S. Aircraft Delivered

No.	Type	Date Delivered	Remarks
8 12 12 4 8 10 7 13 52	F-4E F-4E C-4E C-4E F-4E F-4 A-4 F-4 A-4 F-4 A-4 A-4	23 Oct 73 ··· 24 Oct 73	Completes programmed F-4 delivery. Completes programmed A-4 air delivery. 8 A-4s in transit by ship. 8 A-4s in Norfolk awaiting sealift.

Sorties

	Last 24 Hours		Cumulative
C-141 .C-5 El Al	15 4 2	•	250 81 81

CHARLES K. HEIDEN
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE Situation Report # //

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600

Military Situation

Both fronts remain quiet. The UN Security Council has sent a telegram to UNEF Commander General Siilvasuo instructing him to request the commander of the Israeli Armed Forces to return his troops to positions occupied by them at 1650 October 22. The Israelis claim that the Egyptians attempted to put a bridge across the Canal to the north of Suez city but that the current broke up the bridge before the Israelis could destroy it.

POWs

Cairo's authoritative Al Ahram reported that Egypt would today turn over to the ICRC a list of Israeli prisoners held by Egypt. This action may take some of the steam out of the Knesset debate scheduled for today during which right-wing parties are expected to continue criticism of the government for having agreed to a cease. fire without arrangements for POW repatriation. It may also open the way for the handing over of wounded Egyptian POWs in Israeli hands whose release has been held up pending Egyptian action on the issue. In Amman Ambassador Brown in conversation with the Prime Minister has urged high level Jordanian efforts to get the Syrians to move on this increasingly hot question. Jordanian sources speculate that one issue holding up prisoner return might be Syrian reluctance to see Israeli pilots return to duty.

UNEF/UNTSO

Informal Security Council consultations on the formation of UNEF have been postponed at U.S. suggestion until October 31 by which time signs of movement on the POW issue may have softened the Israeli position toward

> SECRET/EXDIS GDS - DECLAS Dec. 31, 1981

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RF KE/M S/PRS A/WIG PM INR

WHI. (LDX) DOD (LDX) CIA (LDX) NSA (LDX) PA/HO

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SECRET/EXDIS

UNEF composition. The SYG will make an announcement on October 30 of the dispatch of a 500 man Finnish UNEF contingent which the USG has agreed to airlift from Helsinki to Cairo.

Libya and Oil

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The Libyan radio has announced a Libyan decision to completely suspend oil exports to the Netherlands as of October 30. According to the announcement this step was taken because of the unsatisfactory Dutch response to a Libyan request for clarification of the Netherland's position on the ME conflict.

Arab Boycott Action

The Belgian Foreign Office has received a report from its Embassy in Damascus that the Arab Boycott Office there has warned Sabena, Air France, KLM, Lufthansa and Pan Am that they will be boycotted if they resume service to Israel (Sabena resumed service October 29; Pan Am does not fly to Israel). The Belgian Embassy in Damascus has been instructed to inform the Boycott Office that this demand is "exhorbitant." The Belgians understand that the French have sent similar instructions to their Embassy in Damascus.

APPROVED BY:

DEPUTY DIRECT FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS

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THEO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1051
USMISSION PERLIN 1757
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AMEMBASSY PAPID 3577
AHEMBASSY PRACOE 1742
AMEMBASSY PERACOE 1742
AMEMBASSY SUFIC 1415
USMISSION USPID BY 3276
AMEMBASSY PARS W 2107

Soviet Pine

#18

CUMITILLAL WROCH 1300

h.O. 11652: Gus

TAGS: PFOR, UK, US, XF

SUBJ: THERGING SEVIET ME LINE

21. EMBASSY CONVERSATIONS WITH MEA OFFICIALS AND SOVIET JOURNALISTS AT SPASO RECEPTION OCTUBER 29 PRODUCED FOLLO-106 INSTORTS INTO EMERGING LINE WITHIN SOVIET CIRCLES ON SCENARIO AND MEANING DEME EVENTS:

A. AGREEMENT U. CHASE-FIF WAS REACHED DURING
KISSINGLP-RREZHNEV TALKS, BUT U.S. FALIED TO
DLIVER ISPAELI OBSERVANCE OF INITIAL CHASE-FIRE
B. JOINT SOVIET-U.S. DESPATCH OF FORCES TO THE
CHASE-FIE LINE WAS PORPUSED -- IN FACE OF ISRAELI
VIOLATIONS -- AS AN ATTEMPT TO RESTORE SITUATION.
C. WHATEVE PREPARATIONS WERE MADE ON SOVIET SIDE
WERE UNDERTAKEN FOR PURPOSE OF JOINT ACTION ONLY. NOT
FUR PURPOSE OF UNITATERAL SOVIET ACTION. (THIS WAS
MEA LINE: PRAVDA OFFICIAL MERELY CHALLENGED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON SOVIET PREPARATIONS, ASKING WHETHER
U.S. INTELLIGENCE WAS ANY BETTER NOW THAN WHEN IT
FAILED TO FUREJARN OF SUVIET MOVEMENT INTO
CZECHOSLOVAKIA.)

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PLAYED UP DOMESTICALLY, WAS EXCESSIVE AND FAR OUT OF LINE WITH WHAT HAD BEEN DOME ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

E. MOST IMPORTANT THING NOW IS TO GET URGENT AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH SC RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING OPENING OF NEUTILATIONS. PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS ON IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-SUVIET ROLE IN THIS REGARD WERE MOST APPROPRIATE.

F. WHILE LAST WEEK'S EVENTS WREEDISTURBING, IT IS HOPED THAT THEY WILL NUT ADVERSERLY EFFECT U.S.-SUVIET RELATIONS.

-2. OUR SOVIET SOURCES DID NUT CONTEND THAT JOINT SUVIET-U.S. EFFORTS TO POLICE CLASE-FIE WERE DESIRABLE PER SE, AND THEY DID NOT DENY THAT SUCH EFFORTS CAPRILD GREAT RISKS. THEY TENDED TO TREAT THEM, PURELY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEED FOR FIRM ACTION OF THE FACE OF ISRAELI VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

A 3. EMBOFFS HELD UP THEIR SIDE OF THE CONVERSATIONS ABY DRAWING ON PUBLIC U.S. STATEMENTS.

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